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OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #1018/01 3651455
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 311455Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1009
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 0013
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 0593
RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0987
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY 0081
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0101
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0198
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0133
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL PRIORITY 0105
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 0059
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0518
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY 0038
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY 0566
RUEHNV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY 0572
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1181
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0454
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0055

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001018

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2020
TAGS: [PINS](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PINR](#) [GV](#) [MO](#)
SUBJECT: GUINEA LATEST: DADIS AND BEYOND?

REF: A. RABAT 1009
[1](#)B. RABAT 0988

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Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (S/NF) Summary: XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOffs on December 30 that despite Dadis Camara's apparent desire to depart Morocco (Ref A), he is in no condition to travel and will not be able to resume control of the country. Minister of National Defense Sekouba Konate and an assistant, Mr. Bah, along with Minister of Communications Idrissa Cherif have been in Rabat to visit Dadis, but Konate planned to return to Guinea by December 31, possibly to present to the Guinean people a case for his assumption of power in place of Dadis. The next ten days would be telling and potentially chaotic for the country, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, but with the assistance of the international community, Konate should be able to control the army and avert violence that could have regional implications. End Summary.

[1](#)2. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOffs on December 30 that Dadis Camara was in no condition to travel and would not be able to control Guinea again. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Dadis Camara still had a bullet in his head, suffered from impaired vision and speech, and was not fully aware of his surroundings. XXXXXXXXXXXX admitted that he had not seen Dadis; according to him only Konate and Bah were allowed into his room. Regarding earlier news reports that Dadis was preparing to speak to the Guinean people, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that if Dadis could speak to the media, he certainly would have by now. Evidently Dadis also suffered from heart problems unrelated to the gunshot wounds.

[1](#)3. (S/NF) Konate evidently was not in the best of health, either, and sought medical consultation while here in Rabat. Reportedly a heavy drinker, Konate suffered from liver problems consistent with his intake of large amounts of alcohol. On December 30, senior Moroccan military officials separately questioned Konate's fitness to lead, calling him weak.

[1](#)4. (S/NF) For XXXXXXXXXXXX, Konate's travel to Rabat allowed him to return to Guinea and report on the basis of his first-hand knowledge t

[1](#)5. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX went on to say that Cherif was behind demonstrations being planned for Conakry, while Pivi, who was from the same ethnic group as Dadis, might organize supporters on an ethnic basis and incite clashes with other groups. Given that ethnic and national boundaries are not coterminous, this could affect neighboring countries and plunge the entire region into chaos (Ref B), asserted XXXXXXXXXXXX. With the help of the United States and European countries, Konate would be able to take power and control the army, which lacked discipline and had too many crooks and militias, but XXXXXXXXXXXX did not specify what sort of assistance from the international community would be necessary.

[1](#)6. (S/NF) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX urged intervention, both to keep Dadis out of Guinea and to support an effort by Konate to take power in the country, in order to forestall devastating ethnic violence. His argument that Dadis would

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have made a public statement by now if he could have is compelling, while his comment that Konate would have other CNDL leaders arrested suggests that the fate of Guinea does not depend on Dadis alone. Dadis has amassed militias and enjoys some popular support (Ref B), and for XXXXXXXXXXXX his return would undoubtedly lead to violence and unrest. His continued absence, however, might not preclude it. End Comment.

[1](#)7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.

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